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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON DEFENDANTS WHO DID
NOT KILL OR INTEND TO KILL

INTRODUCTION
A man stalks a playground where young children are enjoying their
afternoon recess. He convinces a six-year-old girl to help him find his lost
puppy. Once outside the school fence, the man grabs the girl and takes her to a
remote wooded area, where he rapes and sodomizes her. He cannot take the
chance of the girl telling her parents, so when he is finished, he picks up a rock
and crushes her skull. You see, if she would have told anyone about their
encounter, he would have had to go back to prison, where he just finished
serving time for raping a minor.
The man is apprehended. He is tried by a jury of his peers.1 He is
sentenced to death.2
In the next county, an unemployed woman is told about a “fool-proof” plan
to get some quick cash. Her boyfriend tells her about a drug-dealing neighbor
who keeps a lot of cash in his house, and who is not likely to report a robbery.
They formulate a plan in which they will sneak into the house, the boyfriend
will threaten the owner with a sawed-off shotgun, and the two will take any
money they can find. Because her rent already is a month past due, and
believing that no one would get hurt, she agrees to help with the robbery.
When they get to the house, the woman, as planned, is unarmed. However,
before she realizes what is happening, the boyfriend breaks through a window,
enters the home, and immediately shoots the owner in the head.3
1. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants criminal defendants the right to be
tried by an impartial jury from the state and district where the defendant allegedly committed the
crime. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”).
2. This hypothetical death sentence is based on the Oklahoma murder and death penalty
statutes: “A person commits murder in the first degree when that person unlawfully and with
malice aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7.A (West Supp. 2006). In Oklahoma, a
person who is convicted of first degree murder can be punished by death. § 701.9.A.
3. The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on those in State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d
1067 (1987). In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder under Maine’s accomplice
895
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The woman is apprehended. She is tried by a jury of her peers.4 She, too,
is sentenced to death.5
The first hypothetical crime is one that legitimately may be classified as
among “the most serious of crimes.”6 After terrorizing the young girl, the
defendant formed the intent to kill her and did, in fact, kill her simply because
he did not want to take the chance of returning to prison.
In the second example, the defendant did not intend for anyone to get
hurt—much less, to be killed. Although her intentions were not innocent, they
did not include fatal violence. However, intent alone does not determine
punishment in many jurisdictions.7
In its two most recent decisions limiting the application of the death
penalty, the Supreme Court reiterated that the death penalty must be reserved
for offenders who are guilty of “a narrow category of the most serious
crimes.”8 The Court emphasized that the death penalty only should apply to
those who are “most deserving of execution” because of their “extreme
culpability.”9
Applying the death penalty in felony murder cases brings these concepts
into serious question.10 Two landmark Supreme Court decisions have
liability statute. Id. at 1068. To be convicted under an accomplice liability theory, which is the
basis for a felony murder conviction of a nontriggerman, the defendant’s conduct does not have to
be causally necessary for the crime to have occurred. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 470 (3d ed. 2001). In other words, an accomplice can be liable for a murder even
if the principal would have killed the victim without the defendant’s participation. Id.
4. Again, according to the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment. See supra note 1.
5. This hypothetical death sentence also is based on the Oklahoma murder and death
penalty statutes. §§ 701.7.A, 701.9.A. “A person . . . commits the crime of murder in the first
degree, regardless of malice, when that person or any other person takes the life of a human being
during, or if the death of a human being results from, the commission or attempted commission of
[an enumerated felony].” § 701.7.B.
6. While there is no precise definition of what constitutes the “most serious of crimes,” one
author suggests that they are those crimes that “most outrage the conscience of the community.”
SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING WITH THE
DEATH PENALTY 34 (2003).
7. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West Supp. 2006):
Unless an intent to kill is specifically required [in an enumerated special circumstance], an
actual killer . . . need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the
offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or
confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-8 (Supp. 2006) (“Homicide perpetrated by an act imminently
dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, is not the less
murder because there was no actual intent to injure others.”).
8. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002).
9. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
10. Scott Turow maintains that the death penalty is not, in practice, reserved for the most
egregious crimes and the most culpable offenders. TUROW, supra note 6, at 71. In Lake County,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA

897

attempted to define the parameters of when it is constitutional to impose the
death penalty on defendants who participate in felonies in which someone is
killed, but who did not themselves kill or intend to kill.11 In Enmund v.
Florida, the Court held that, to apply the death penalty, a defendant must have
intended for a killing to take place.12 Five years later, in Tison v. Arizona, the
Court clarified that the culpability requirement for imposing the death penalty
can be satisfied by the defendant’s “major participation in the felony,” and his
or her “reckless indifference to human life.”13
Two years after deciding Tison, the Court decided two other landmark
cases, upholding the death penalty in both of them. In 1989, in Penry v.
Lynaugh, the Court held that executing mentally retarded offenders did not
violate the Eighth Amendment.14 The same day that it ruled on Penry, the
Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that executing an offender who was sixteen
or seventeen years old at the time of the crime did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.15 Together with Tison, these cases represent an era
during which the Court narrowly defined “cruel and unusual punishment” so
that it remained constitutional to execute certain categories of offenders.
The Court may be entering a new era, as in 2002 and 2005, respectively, it
held that mentally retarded offenders and juvenile offenders lack the
culpability required to justify imposing the death penalty.16 In light of these
decisions to restrict the use of the death penalty, which overruled Penry and
Stanford, the Court may be primed to revisit the Tison issue of whether a

Illinois, a man was sentenced to death when a botched robbery attempt resulted in the victim’s
death. Id. While this defendant was sentenced to death, several other murderers did not receive
the death penalty, including a mother who fed acid to her baby, a man who killed his friend by
placing him on railroad tracks in front of an oncoming train, and a man who killed four people.
Id.
11. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982).
12. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
13. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
14. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
15. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
16. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002). The Atkins Court held that mentally retarded offenders are not among the most morally
culpable “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses . . . .” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306. The Roper Court held that juveniles cannot be
considered among the most culpable of offenders because of their lack of maturity, their
susceptibility to outside pressure and influence, and their lack of character development as
compared to adult offenders. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. Turow suggests that the deterrent
rationale does not justify executing juvenile offenders because they are among a class of citizens
that are not capable of understanding the future. TUROW, supra note 6, at 60. In Turow’s
experience in representing such offenders, they “act out a range of narcissistic and infantile
impulses—rage, perverted self-loathing, or a grandiose conviction they’ll never be caught—in
which consequences have no role.” Id.
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defendant who did not kill or intend to kill also lacks the culpability required to
justify imposing the ultimate punishment.17 If the Court does revisit the issue
for the first time in almost twenty years, it likely will consider the same factors
that it has in most other death penalty decisions: 1) current legislative
judgments, 2) culpability and justification rationales, 3) jury sentencing trends,
and 4) international law and opinions.
There has been no survey of state legislation since Tison to determine
whether there has been a shift in the national consensus regarding the
execution of nontriggermen. This research will fill that gap. This Comment
will review current legislative judgments, culpability and justification
rationales, and international law to analyze the constitutionality of imposing
the death penalty on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill.18 Part I will
review the Enmund and Tison decisions and the Court’s current position on the
issue. The author will provide a critique of the Tison Court’s claims and
reasoning in Part II. Part III will provide an analysis of current state statutes
and compare the findings to those that the Court relied on in Tison. Part IV
will explore the culpability and justification rationales for applying the death
penalty, and whether the goals of deterrence and retribution are satisfied when
the death penalty is imposed on a defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.
Part V will discuss current international law regarding the death penalty and
whether executing defendants who did not kill or intend to kill violates
international standards and treaties. The Comment will conclude with the
author’s reasoning as to why imposing the death penalty in felony murder
cases that lack intent is contrary to the country’s “evolving standards of
decency”19 and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
I. ENMUND AND TISON: INTENT VS. RECKLESSNESS
A.

Enmund v. Florida

In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida that, in applying
the death penalty, the punishment “must be tailored to [the defendant’s]
personal responsibility and moral guilt.”20 The Court said that the Eighth

17. Also contributing to the decision’s vulnerability is the fact that Tison was a 5-4 decision.
Tison, 481 U.S. 137.
18. This Comment will not explore or discuss jury sentencing decisions, but future research
in this area would be valuable in determining how often juries actually impose the death penalty
on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill.
19. Writing for the majority in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy explained that
interpreting the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires the
Court to refer to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” 543 U.S. at 560–61.
20. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
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Amendment21 prohibits executing a defendant who participated in an
underlying felony in a felony murder case, but did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend for a killing to take place.22
The Enmund case involved a botched robbery attempt in which two
defendants shot and killed an elderly couple.23 The plan was for Sampson and
Jeanette Armstrong to knock on the back door of the victims’ farmhouse, ask
for water for an overheated car, and then demand money while holding one of
the victims at gunpoint.24 The plan turned fatal when the victim’s wife came
out of the house, shot Jeanette Armstrong, and then one of the Armstrongs shot
and killed both victims.25 A jury sentenced Sampson Armstrong and the driver
of the getaway car, Earl Enmund, to death.26
The jury convicted Enmund based on Florida’s felony murder statute,
which the judge summarized in the jury instructions: “The killing of a human
being while engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate the
offense of robbery is murder in the first degree even though there is no
premeditated design or intent to kill.”27 Because one of Florida’s statutory
aggravating circumstances was that the murder was committed while the
defendant was “engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of an armed
robbery,” Enmund essentially was eligible for the death penalty based solely
on the fact that he participated in a robbery in which another person killed
someone.28

21. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”). Courts traditionally have found a punishment “cruel and
unusual” if it does not have deterrent or retributive value, or if it is “grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime.” Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 144 (1987).
22. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
23. Id. at 784.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 785.
27. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784–85.
28. Id. at 785. The jury also found the following statutory aggravators to exist, in support of
their verdict: 1) the defendant committed the capital felony for pecuniary gain, 2) the capital
felony was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” and 3) the defendant previously was
convicted of a violent felony. Id. The purpose of including aggravating circumstances in death
penalty statutes is to force legislatures to create “exacting guidelines about the factual
circumstances under which capital punishment may even be considered.” TUROW, supra note 6,
at 55. However, legislatures tend to adjust the number of aggravating circumstances to
correspond to electorate pressure. Id. at 68. For example, when a Chicago community policing
volunteer was killed in 1998, the Illinois legislature responded by making the murder of a
community policing volunteer eligible for capital punishment. Id. Felony murder aggravators
provide prosecutors with a way to pursue the death penalty more easily than under other
aggravating circumstances. Id. As a result, 60% of the condemned prisoners on Illinois’ death
row were convicted and sentenced based on felony murder eligibility. Id. Turow argues that
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the death penalty is
constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for a defendant
who “neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.”29 As it
did in an earlier constitutional analysis of the death penalty, the Court
considered the history of the punishment, current statutes, international
opinion, and jury sentencing decisions.30
1.

Statutes

At the time the Court decided Enmund, thirty-six state and federal
jurisdictions authorized the death penalty.31 The Court used statistics
summarizing the current status of death penalty statutes to support its finding
that legislative judgment “weigh[ed] on the side of rejecting capital
punishment for the crime at issue.”32
Eleven states required the government to prove a defendant’s culpable
mental state before the jury could impose the death penalty.33 In eight of those
states, the mental state had to include an actual intent to kill.34
On the other hand, only eight jurisdictions allowed the death penalty
simply for participating in a robbery in which another robber kills someone
(i.e., felony murder simpliciter).35 In four jurisdictions, felony murder was not
a capital crime.36
Nine states allowed for the death penalty to be imposed in a felony murder
situation in which the defendant was not the actual killer only if the statutory
aggravating circumstances were above and beyond the felony murder itself,
and they outweighed the mitigating circumstances.37 In three of these states,
felony murder was not included in the lists of statutory aggravating
adding crimes to the list of felony murders that are eligible for the death penalty results in
unfettered prosecutorial discretion as to when to pursue the death penalty, which in turn leads to
unfair disbursement of the punishment. Id. at 69. While responding to the electorate and
considering its concerns are fundamental duties of the legislature, the legislature must not respond
to a simply emotional public by adding ways for a criminal to be executed.
29. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787.
30. Id. at 788–89. The Court followed the same format in its analysis in Coker v. Georgia,
where the Court held that it was unconstitutional to execute a defendant for the rape of an adult
woman. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
31. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789.
32. Id. at 789–93.
33. Id. at 789–90.
34. Id. at 790. The other three states required a showing “short of intent, such as
recklessness or extreme indifference to human life.” Id.
35. Id. at 789. Felony murder simpliciter requires no showing of culpable intent to commit a
homicide. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987). Florida was one of the states that
allowed the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter. Id. at n.5.
36. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 791.
37. Id. at 791–92. Depending on the aggravating circumstances, a defendant in these nine
states could be put to death without proving an intent to kill. Id. at 791.
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circumstances.38 Six of these states, however, provided for a statutory
mitigating circumstance in which the defendant’s participation in the capital
felony was relatively minor compared to other actors in the crime.39 The Court
reasoned that the states included these mitigating circumstances to reduce the
chances of a defendant receiving the death penalty for a vicarious felony
murder.40
The Court summarized the statutory findings by pointing out that only
about one-third of American jurisdictions would allow a defendant to be
executed for the crime of participating in a robbery in which a murder
occurred.41 In addition, none of the eight states that had enacted new death
penalty legislation in the preceding four years allowed for the death penalty to
be applied in such a situation.42
2.

International Opinion

The majority in Enmund mentioned international opinion only in a
footnote, to support its finding that the public considers the death penalty
disproportionate in a case such as Enmund’s.43 The Court pointed out that
India and England had abolished the felony murder doctrine and that Canada
and several other countries had severely restricted it.44 Continental Europe, at
the time, had never even recognized the doctrine.45
3.

Deterrence and Retribution

The majority concluded its opinion with an analysis of the justifications for
the death penalty and their application to the Enmund case.46 The “principal
social purposes” that the death penalty addresses are retribution and
deterrence.47 The Court found that these justifications do not apply to a case in
which the defendant did not kill or intend to kill.48
38. Id. at 792.
39. Id. at 791–92.
40. Id. at 792. In Roper v. Simmons, Justice O’Connor claimed that the presence of
mitigators considering the age of the offender shows that the states contemplated the issue of
whether seventeen-year-olds should be subjected to the death penalty and decided that a
categorical ban was not appropriate. 543 U.S. 551, 606 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). These
mitigators, O’Connor said, show that some legislatures have concluded that some seventeen-yearolds are mature enough to deserve the punishment; therefore, the Court should not interfere with
the legislatures’ judgments. Id. at 606–07.
41. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 796 n.22.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797–801.
47. Id. at 798 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). The Court noted that,
unless the death penalty serves the goal of retribution or deterrence, it “is nothing more than the
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To support its conclusion that the death penalty would not serve a deterrent
function in Enmund’s case, the Court relied on research showing that only a
very small fraction of robberies resulted in a homicide.49 Because the
likelihood that someone would be killed in any given robbery was so small, the
Court reasoned that an accomplice should not share the blame for a killing
simply because he or she took part in the robbery.50
For retribution to be a legitimate justification for the death penalty, the
Court stressed that it must be proportionate to the defendant’s culpability.51 In
Enmund’s case, his culpability was limited to his participation in the robbery,
since he had no intention of anyone being killed.52 The Court summarized:
“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and
had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to
the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”53
B.

Tison v. Arizona

Five years later, in 1987, the Tison Court stripped the Enmund holding of
some of its effect by holding that the death penalty is constitutional in a felony
murder case when 1) the defendant was a major participant in the underlying
felony and 2) the defendant exhibited a reckless indifference to human life.54
The Court did not overrule Enmund, but rather clarified that the above two
elements actually combined to satisfy the culpability mandated in Enmund.55
In Tison, the defendants, Ricky and Raymond Tison, took a chest full of
guns into a prison to help their father, Gary Tison, and his cellmate, Randy
Greenawalt, escape.56 During the escape, no one fired any shots and no one
was injured.57 However, a couple of days after the escape, the group decided
to steal a car.58 One of the defendants flagged down a car that was occupied by
a man, his wife, their two-year-old son, and their fifteen-year-old niece, to help
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” which would make it an
unconstitutional punishment. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
48. Id. at 799–801.
49. Id. at 799 n.23. A recent study at the time that the Court decided Enmund showed that
only 0.43% of robberies in the U.S. ended in homicide. Id. at 800 n.24.
50. Id. at 801. The Court said: “It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the
course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he
somehow participated in the felony.” Id. at 799.
51. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800.
52. Id. at 801.
53. Id.
54. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 139. Gary Tison was serving a life sentence for killing a guard during a previous
escape attempt. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 139–40.
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with a “flat tire.”59 The criminals drove the family into a deserted area, where
they planned to switch cars with the family.60 After telling the family to stand
in front of one of the cars, Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt shot and killed
all four of them.61 The Tison brothers claimed they were surprised by the
shooting, but admitted that they did not try to help the family.62
The Tison brothers and Greenawalt were tried separately for the capital
murders of the four victims.63 The Tisons were convicted based on Arizona’s
felony murder statute, which made it a capital offense for someone to be
involved in a kidnapping or robbery in which a person is killed.64 The judge
sentenced both of the Tisons to death.65
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted “intent” to include
recklessness and subsequently found that because of his reckless participation
in the crime, Raymond Tison did intend to kill; therefore, his death sentence
did not violate Enmund.66 The Arizona court reasoned that, because Raymond
played an active part in all of the events leading up to the murders (including
providing weapons when he knew of his father’s murder conviction), and
because he did nothing to stop the murders or to disassociate himself from his
father and Greenawalt after the murders, he intended to kill.67 In Ricky
Tison’s appeal, the court said that Ricky’s involvement basically was the same
as Raymond’s and that his death sentence would not violate Enmund.68
The Supreme Court granted certiorari as to the issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment bars the application of the death penalty to a defendant who
played a substantial role in the underlying felony and who acted with reckless
indifference to the value of human life.69 The Court again relied heavily on
state legislatures’ judgment in assessing the proportionality of the
punishment.70 The majority ended with a brief discussion about culpability,
but it based its decision mostly on the status of state legislation.71

59. Tison, 481 U.S. at 140.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 140–41.
62. Id. at 141.
63. Id. Gary Tison died of exposure after escaping to the desert. Id. Another Tison brother
who was involved, Donald Tison, died in a police shootout following the murders. Id.
64. Tison, 481 U.S. at 141.
65. Id. at 143.
66. Id. at 143–45, 151.
67. Id. at 144–45.
68. Id. at 145, 151.
69. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. at 152. The Court explained that the Enmund Court did not
address this specific situation. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 158.
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Statutes

The Court began its analysis by pointing out that “four states authorize[d]
the death penalty in felony murder cases” in which the defendant acted with a
“culpable mental state such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human
life.”72 The Court did not specifically mention, as the Enmund Court did, how
many states required a showing of intent to kill before the death penalty could
be applied in a felony murder case.73
The Court claimed that a majority of jurisdictions “specifically authorize”
the death penalty in a felony murder case when the defendant substantially
participated in a felony in which he knew there was a high likelihood of
death.74 In its calculation of a “majority,” the Court included the following:
the four states referenced above that allowed for the death penalty in felony
murder cases as long as the defendant acted with a culpable mental state, two
states that required that the defendant’s participation be “substantial” before
authorizing the death penalty, at least six states that provided a statutory
mitigator of minor participation in the felony, six states that allowed the death
penalty for felony murder simpliciter, and three states that required proof of an
additional aggravator before imposing the death penalty.75
According to the Tison Court, only a “small minority” of jurisdictions that
allowed the death penalty for felony murder required an intent to kill before
imposing the punishment.76 Specifically, the Court said that eleven death
penalty states prohibited imposing the death penalty in situations in which “the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder is major and the likelihood of
killing is so substantial as to raise an inference of extreme recklessness.”77
As for statutory changes that took place between Enmund and Tison, the
Court conceded, in a footnote, that Mississippi and Nevada had changed their
statutes since Enmund to require a finding that “the defendant killed, attempted
to kill, or intended to kill, or that lethal force be employed.”78 The Court also
mentioned that New Jersey recently had enacted legislation allowing for the
death penalty in intentional murder cases, but not in felony murder cases.79 In
1985, Oregon began authorizing the death penalty for felony murders, but only
if the defendant intended to kill.80 After Enmund, Vermont changed its death

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 152–55.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 153–54.
Id. at 152–54.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 152 n.4.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 152 n.4.
Id.
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penalty statute to allow for the punishment only in circumstances in which a
correctional officer was killed.81
2.

Culpability

After finding that “a majority of American jurisdictions clearly authorize
capital punishment” for cases such as the Tisons’, the Court went on to assess
the proportionality of the punishment.82 The Court pointed out that a
defendant’s mental state is critical in determining culpability in a capital
crime.83 Also critical is the idea that the more purposeful the conduct, and the
more serious the crime, the harsher the punishment should be.84
The Court disagreed with the notion that an intent to kill can distinguish
the most culpable and dangerous killers.85 It reasoned that some killers who
intended to kill are not even criminally liable, such as those who do so in selfdefense.86 On the other hand, the Court said, murder lacking intent, such as
that involving torture or committed during a robbery, can be the most
dangerous and inhumane.87 The reckless indifference to the value of human
life that is inherent in such crimes can, according to the Court, shock the
“moral sense” just as much as an intent to kill.88
The Tison Court summarized the Enmund Court holding as follows: “when
‘intent to kill’ results in its logical though not inevitable consequence—the
taking of human life—the Eighth Amendment permits the State to exact the
death penalty . . . .”89 The Tison Court took the Enmund holding a step further,
holding that “reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly
culpable mental state . . . that may be taken into account in making a capital
sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though not
inevitable, lethal result.”90 This language establishes that reckless participation
in certain dangerous felonies may involve a culpable mental state on par with
other capital crimes and is worthy of the death penalty.91

81. Id.
82. Id. at 155.
83. Id. at 156.
84. Tison, 481 U.S. at 156.
85. Id. at 157.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157.
90. Id. at 157–58.
91. The determination of whether a particular crime carries a “grave risk of death” is factsensitive. For example, although not all robberies may be included in this category, one that
involved a convicted killer who recently broke out of prison and was armed with an arsenal of
weapons most likely would be.
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II. CRITIQUE OF THE TISON OPINION
A.

Brennan’s Dissent

Writing for a four-Justice dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out several
flaws in the majority’s opinion.92 The dissent criticized the majority for
neglecting to include a proper proportionality analysis, which the Constitution
requires.93 Justice Brennan asserted that, absent a defendant’s intent to kill, a
death sentence cannot be proportional.94
The dissent provided a summary of the Enmund Court’s proportionality
review, including its analysis of the retributive and deterrent functions of the
Enmund decision.95 Justice Brennan also pointed out several flaws in how the
Court calculated the states’ legislative judgments regarding imposing the death
penalty in cases such as the Tisons’.96 In addition, according to the dissent, a
complete and proper constitutional analysis of the death penalty requires the
Court to review jury sentencing trends and the actual imposition of the death
penalty in similar cases, which the majority did not do.97
The majority’s incomplete constitutional analysis was reason enough for
the four Justices to dissent.98 However, Justice Brennan inferred that the most
disturbing aspect of the opinion was that the Court’s new rule could result in
arbitrary results in virtually identical cases.99
B.

Flawed Calculations

Much of the Tison majority’s opinion consisted of a survey of then-current
state death penalty statutes.100 As mentioned above, the majority did not
provide a deterrent rationale to support its decision, nor did it review jury
sentencing decisions. Because the legislative judgments are among the only
objective criteria that the Court uses to justify new rules regarding the death
penalty, it is critical that the numbers are accurate and are not misleading.101

92. Tison, 481 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined in the dissent.
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id. at 170.
95. Id. at 172–74.
96. Id. at 174–75.
97. Tison, 481 U.S. 176–79.
98. Id. at 182.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 152–55 (majority opinion).
101. The Atkins decision, as well as other major death penalty decisions, stressed the
importance of using objective factors in a death penalty proportionality review. Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). “Proportionality review under those evolving standards
should be informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent.’” Id. (quoting
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)).
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As the Court reiterated in Atkins v. Virginia, “the clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country’s legislatures.”102 Such evidence is clear and reliable only if
calculated and interpreted correctly.
The majority did not include in its calculations jurisdictions that did not
have a death penalty, nor those that authorized it only in circumstances other
than those described in the Tison opinion.103 If the Court had included these
jurisdictions in its analysis, it would have been forced to admit that a majority
of jurisdictions at that time prohibited imposing the death penalty on
nontriggermen104 who did not intend to kill.105
At the time of the opinion, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had
abolished the death penalty, and four other states restricted the death penalty to
those who actually and intentionally kill.106 The majority, on the other hand,
claimed that “only [eleven] states authorizing capital punishment forbid
imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant’s participation in the
felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise
an inference of extreme recklessness.”107 However, this statement is
misleading because the majority apparently included in its sample only states
that authorized the death penalty for felony murder—not all states that
authorized the death penalty. The more accurate statement would be that “only
[eleven] states authorizing capital punishment [for felony murder] forbid
imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant’s participation in the
felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise
an inference of extreme recklessness.” In actuality, fifteen states authorizing
capital punishment refused to impose the death penalty under such
circumstances, and twenty-nine jurisdictions altogether forbade it.108
1.

No “Specific Authorization”

As mentioned above, the Court claimed that a majority of jurisdictions
“specifically authorize” the death penalty in felony murder cases where the
defendant may not have had an intent to kill, but was a major participant “in a

102. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
103. Tison, 481 U.S. at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. This Comment will use the term “nontriggermen” to refer to defendants in a felony
murder case who did not actually kill (or attempt to kill).
105. Tison, 481 U.S. at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 175 n.13.
107. Id. at 154 (majority opinion).
108. The twenty-nine jurisdictions consisted of the fifteen death penalty states that did not
allow for the death penalty under these circumstances, plus the thirteen states, along with the
District of Columbia, that did not allow the death penalty under any circumstances. Id. at 175 &
n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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felony in which he knew death was highly likely to occur.”109 This author
disagrees with the Court’s use of the phrase “specifically authorize[s],”
because no statute’s plain language authorizes the imposition of the death
penalty in the circumstances described by the Court. Even if the Court
interprets the statutes as allowing the death penalty for the situation, to say that
the jurisdictions “specifically authorize” it implies legislative intent that is not
as obvious as the phrase suggests.
If the legislators had intended to “specifically authorize” the death penalty
in certain circumstances, they most likely would have spelled out those
circumstances in the statute. If the legislature did not spell out the
circumstances, then it actually is the Court that is authorizing the punishment.
This legitimately can be within a court’s discretion, but the Court should not
attempt to use legislative intent to support its decision when such legislative
intent may not exist.
2.

Overlapping Categories

The subcategories into which the majority placed the states are not
mutually exclusive, as the opinion implies. For example, a state that requires
proof of an additional aggravator also may provide a statutory mitigator that
considers a defendant’s minor participation in the felony or may require proof
of a culpable mental state, or both.110 Therefore, the majority’s grouping
would not work today because adding the subgroups together would result in
double- or triple-counting some states.
Placing the states into so many categories tends to confuse the reader and
complicate the issue. The ultimate issue that the Court appeared ready to
address was whether it is constitutional to impose the death penalty on a
defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.111 However, if the Court had
remained focused on this issue, then it may not have been able to support its
decision with its analysis of legislative judgments. Therefore, the Tison
majority ended up creating a narrowly defined category that it could stretch the
legislative findings to support, and which would allow the Court to impose the
death penalty on the Tison brothers.

109. Id. at 154 (majority opinion).
110. It is not clear whether the categories were mutually exclusive at the time of the Tison
decision, but they currently are not. If they were not mutually exclusive at the time of the
decision, then the majority’s reasoning is even more flawed because the citations do not
accurately represent all of the states that fell into each category.
111. In her introduction to the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor explained: “The question
presented is whether the petitioners’ participation in the events leading up to and following the
murder . . . makes the sentences of death . . . constitutionally permissible although neither
petitioner specifically intended to kill the victims and neither inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds.”
Tison, 481 U.S. at 138.
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C. Weak Culpability Argument
The Tison majority conceded that a defendant’s state of mind is a key
factor in determining his or her culpability in a capital case.112 It admitted that
the American legal tradition is based on the concept that “the more purposeful
is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the
more severely it ought to be punished.”113 However, the majority used weak
examples and seemed to stretch precedent in an effort to reconcile these
concepts with imposing the death penalty on the Tisons.
The Tison majority referred to the Enmund decision, claiming that the
Court in that case allowed the death penalty “at least” in cases where the
felony murderer intentionally killed.114 This summary of the holding was
inaccurate. The Enmund Court specifically noted that Enmund did not kill nor
intend to kill; therefore, his culpability was less than that of his accomplices
who did kill.115 The Court said that the Eighth Amendment did not allow for
the actual killers and Enmund to be treated alike and to be assigned the same
culpability.116
The Enmund Court noted, “It is fundamental that ‘causing harm
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm
unintentionally.’”117 There is no more severe punishment than execution, so in
basing its opinion on this principle, the Enmund Court established that the
death penalty cannot be imposed on someone who did not intend to kill.
The Tison majority then went on to argue that intent to kill is an ineffective
way of “definitively distinguishing the most culpable and dangerous of
murderers.”118 However, the Enmund Court did not claim that intent should
“definitively distinguish” the most culpable offenders. Rather, the Enmund
Court implied that intent to kill was one of the characteristics separating the
most culpable offenders from those less culpable—not the only characteristic
distinguishing them. In other words, the Court was saying that if you have A
(the most culpable offenders), then you must have B (intent); however, the
Court was not necessarily saying the inverse is true (that if you have B, you
must have A). The Enmund Court’s logic, therefore, is not at odds with the
Tison majority’s assessment that those who intentionally kill after being
provoked are not as deserving of the death penalty.119

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
Id.
Id. (quoting H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 158, 162 (1968)).
118. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987).
119. See id.
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The Court’s examples of dangerous murderers who kill “unintentionally”
also are misleading.120 Murder resulting from torture cannot be considered
unintentional when the murderer continually inflicted pain and suffering on
someone, most likely expecting the person to die.121 At least one state
specifically defines torture as including a specific intent to kill.122 As to the
Court’s other example, if a robber shoots someone during the course of a
robbery, it most likely is intentional, even if not premeditated.123 Even in the
Tison case, no one disputed whether the actual shooters intended to kill the
victims during the kidnapping and robbery or whether these men were among
the most dangerous of criminals. Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt
apparently shot the family intentionally, and they may be considered among
the most culpable, dangerous, and inhumane murderers.
D. No Deterrence Rationale
The Tison majority did not discuss the deterrence rationale for applying the
death penalty to situations in which the defendant did not kill or intend to kill.
A Supreme Court opinion regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty is
incomplete without a discussion of both of the primary justifications for
punishment. Other major death penalty Supreme Court opinions in recent

120. See id. at 170 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court’s examples of
torture and murder during a robbery are wanton, yet intentional killings).
121. See id. at 157 (majority opinion) (listing torture as an example of an unintentional
murder that is among the most dangerous and inhumane of crimes). In the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United Nations
defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
art. 1, § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027. The U.S. federal government defines torture as “an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000).
122. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004) (“torture causing death shall be deemed the
equivalent of intent to kill”).
123. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 170 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that premeditation
and deliberation—not intent—are missing from the Court’s examples).
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history discuss how the holding supports the goal of deterrence,124 so the
absence of such a discussion is conspicuous in Tison.
Because the Court claimed that its decision was not contrary to its holding
in Enmund, the fact that it did not discuss the deterrent value of its decision
could imply that the Court was in agreement with its analysis of the subject in
Enmund.125 The Enmund discussion on the subject, however, would not
support the Court’s holding in Tison.126 One also might infer that the Court
could not reconcile its holding with the goal of deterrence, so it left the
discussion out of its opinion. Because the Court essentially is deciding
whether a group of offenders lives or dies, it must be able to justify its decision
by saying that the punishment would serve this social purpose.
III. LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENTS
The ultimate issue that this Comment seeks to answer is whether the
Supreme Court still would find that it is constitutional to impose the death
penalty on a defendant who did not kill or intend to kill. This research
included reviewing each of the state death penalty statutes, considering
whether the statute would allow the death penalty to be imposed on such a
defendant. The author then reviewed each statute and compared its current
status with how it was interpreted by the Tison majority.
A.

States Forbidding the Death Penalty when the Defendant Did Not Kill or
Intend to Kill

Currently, thirty-eight states authorize the use of the death penalty.127 Of
those thirty-eight states, sixteen prohibit imposing the death penalty on a
defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.128 Before the death penalty can be
124. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (finding that executing juvenile
offenders cannot be justified by the goals of retribution and deterrence); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 319–20 (2002) (finding that executing mentally retarded offenders does not further the
goals of retribution and deterrence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797–801(1982) (finding
that executing a defendant to avenge murders that he did not commit nor intend to commit does
not contribute to the retribution or deterrence goals).
125. Justice Brennan referred to the Enmund Court’s deterrence and retribution discussion to
support the position that the Tison holding was inconsistent with Enmund. Tison, 481 U.S. at
172–73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 46–50.
127. The following states’ statutes allow for the imposition of the death penalty: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579, app. A (2005).
128. Based on the author’s research, the following states do not allow the death penalty to be
imposed on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill: Alabama, Connecticut, Kansas,
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imposed, fifteen states specifically require that a defendant purposely,
knowingly, or intentionally killed the victim.129 In Maryland, only a murder
defendant who is a principal in the first degree (presumably the killer) is
eligible for the death penalty.130
B.

States Allowing the Death Penalty for Nontriggermen Who Did Not Intend
to Kill

Twenty-two states authorize the death penalty for nontriggermen who had
no intent to kill, but a majority of them have statutory safeguards to minimize
the risk of sentencing such defendants to death.131 This group consists of states
whose statutes: 1) require the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least
one aggravating circumstance in addition to the fact that the murder occurred
during the course of a felony, 2) require the state to prove that a nontriggerman
defendant acted with a culpable mental state, and 3) allow imposition of the
death penalty on nontriggermen simply because they participated in the
underlying felony, referred to by the Tison Court as felony murder simpliciter,
and 4) provide an affirmative defense that is applicable to some nontriggermen
who did not intend to kill.132

Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See infra note 129.
129. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(b), 13A-6-2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-54a (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30
(Supp. 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3(a), (c) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. § 31-20A-5 (2000) (statutory
aggravating circumstances all require an intent to kill, unless the victim was a police officer on
duty); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (West
Supp. 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03
(Vernon Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(1)(a), 10.95.020 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
130. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2002). A principal in the
second degree may be eligible for the death penalty if the victim was a law enforcement officer.
Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(ii). If the victim was a law enforcement officer, a principal in the second degree
still must have intended for the killing to take place, must have been a major participant in the
murder, and must have been present when the murder occurred to be eligible for the death
penalty. Id.
131. According to the author’s research, the following states fall into this category: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Deleware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Wyoming. Although Kentucky does not have a felony murder statute, a
nontriggerman who did not kill or intend to kill can be convicted of murder, a capital offense, if
“under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of
another person.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999).
132. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 153 (1987).
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States Requiring Additional Aggravating Circumstances

Thirteen of these twenty-two states require proof of at least one
aggravating circumstance in addition to the fact that the murder occurred
during the course of a felony.133 This requirement puts the statutes in
compliance with Enmund, so that the death penalty cannot be imposed on
nontriggermen simply because of their participation in the underlying crimes.
2.

States Requiring Proof of a Culpable Mental State

Five states require the government to prove that a nontriggerman defendant
acted with a culpable mental state.134 Of these states, Nevada and South
Carolina require a showing that a murder defendant acted with malice
aforethought, which can be express or implied.135 In fact, Nevada requires
proof of malice aforethought and an additional aggravating circumstance.136
For a nontriggerman in California or Kentucky to be eligible for the death
penalty in a felony murder case, he or she must have acted with reckless or
extreme indifference to human life.137 In Delaware, a defendant who

133. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E)–(F) (Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1.31201(2)(b)(II)(A), 18-1.3-1201(5) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9) (Supp. 2006); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)
(LexisNexis 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)
(Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West
2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h) (2005).
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(d) (West Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2)
(Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.010 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2003).
135. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.010 (2005) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being,
with malice aforethought, either express or implied . . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2003)
(“‘Murder’ is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied.”).
136. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.010, 200.030(1)(b), 200.030(4)(a) (2005).
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(d) (West Supp. 2006) (“[E]very person, not the actual killer,
who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of [an enumerated felony]
which results in the death of some person or persons . . . shall be punished by death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999) (“A person is guilty of murder when . . . under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another
person.”). In Arkansas, a defendant can be guilty of capital murder if he or the killer acts with
extreme indifference to human life: “A person commits capital murder if . . . acting alone or with
one . . . or more other persons, the person commits or attempts to commit [an enumerated felony
and] . . . the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . .” ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10101(a)(1) (2006).
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recklessly caused the death of someone during the course of an enumerated
felony is eligible for the death penalty.138
3.

Felony Murder Simpliciter

Only three states’ statutory language still provides for imposition of the
death penalty on defendants for felony murder simpliciter.139 However,
Enmund established that the death penalty for such crimes is unconstitutional,
so the punishment could not be authorized in these states simply for
participating in the underlying felony—despite what these statutes may
imply.140 Of these states, the Florida statute allows the death penalty only if
the killer was one of the people perpetrating the felony.141 Two of the three
states take a defendant’s minor participation in the capital felony into account
in mitigation of the murder.142
4.

Affirmative Defenses

Three of these twenty-two states provide an affirmative defense for
defendants who did not kill.143 The affirmative defenses include a showing

138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636(a)(2), 4209(e)(1)(j) (Supp. 2004).
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006), 921.141(5)(d) (West 2006); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1(c) (2003), 17-10-30(b)(2) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-17, 15A2000(e)(5) (2005). The Montana statute allows the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter
only in the specific case of aggravated kidnapping. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102(1)(b), 46-18303(2) (2005).
140. It is likely that the state legislatures have not seen the need to update their statutes to
reflect the Enmund rule and rely on the courts to make sure that sentencing is constitutional and
in compliance with Supreme Court decisions.
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(3) (West Supp. 2006) (specifying an offense as second degree
murder if a person is killed by someone other than the person perpetrating or attempting to
perpetrate the felony).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(d) (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(f)(4)
(2005).
143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(b) (2006) (providing an affirmative defense to prosecution
under the felony murder doctrine if the defendant did not kill the victim “or in any way solicit,
command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in the homicidal act’s commission”); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (2006) (providing an affirmative defense to a felony murder charge if the
defendant: 1) was not the only participant in the underlying felony, 2) did not kill or “in any way
solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid in the [killing],” 3) was not armed, 4) had no
reasonable ground to believe that the other participant was armed, 5) did not engage in conduct
likely to result in death or serious bodily injury, nor had any reason to believe other participant
would engage in such conduct, and 6) tried to dissociate himself from the underlying felony after
having reasonable grounds to believe that other participants were armed or intended to inflict
death or serious bodily injury on the victim); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(3)(a)–(e) (2005)
(affirmative defense to a charge of felony murder if the defendant: 1) was not the only participant
in the underlying felony, 2) did not kill or “in any way solicit, request, command, importune,
cause or aid in the [killing],” 3) was not armed, 4) had no reasonable ground to believe that other
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that the defendant did not kill or intend in any way for another participant to
kill.144 Similarly, before a jury can impose the death penalty on a defendant in
Mississippi, it must make a written finding that the defendant killed, attempted
to kill, intended for the killing to happen, or contemplated that lethal force
would be used.145
However, in Arkansas, defendants such as the Tisons cannot use the
affirmative defenses if they aid in the commission of the murder, as the Tisons
did by supplying the weapons. The Tisons would not have been able to use an
affirmative defense in Colorado or Oregon because, at the very least, they
knew that the killers (their accomplices) were armed.
C. Comparison of Current Statutes to Those Characterized by the Tison
Majority
The Tison majority classified states according to various subgroups,
including the following: 1) states that allow the death penalty with proof of a
culpable mental state short of intent, 2) states in which the defendant’s
participation must be substantial, 3) states that have statutory mitigators that
take the defendant’s minor participation into account, 4) states that require
proof of at least one additional aggravating circumstance, and 5) states that
authorize the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter.146 The Court then
grouped states into two distinct, mutually exclusive categories: 1) states that
allow the death penalty in felony murder cases where the defendant did not
intend to kill, but did substantially participate in a felony in which he knew it
was highly likely that death would occur, and 2) states that do not allow the
death penalty even when the defendant substantially participated in the felony
murder and he or she acted with extreme recklessness.147
Since the Court decided Tison, the number of states in each category has
changed. This section will review some of the more significant legislative
changes.
1.

Affirmative Defenses

The Tison majority did not specifically mention how many states provided
affirmative defenses in their statutes for nontriggermen involved in felony
murders.148 Seven states currently include affirmative defenses to murder in
their statutes so that nontriggermen who did not intend to kill are not punished

participants were armed, and 5) had no reasonable ground to believe that other participants would
“engage in conduct likely to result in death”).
144. See supra note 143.
145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(7) (2000).
146. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152–53 (1987).
147. Id. at 154.
148. See id. at 152–54.
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on the same level as triggermen and nontriggermen who intended for a killing
to take place.149 Four states that provide an affirmative defense for such
nontriggermen also require a showing of intent to kill before imposing the
death penalty.150
By providing these affirmative defenses, states that otherwise would allow
the death penalty in felony murder cases are ensuring that a defendant’s
participation in the felony murder is substantial before imposing the
punishment. The Tison majority characterized two jurisdictions as requiring a
defendant’s substantial participation in the felony murder before allowing
imposition of the death penalty: Connecticut and a federal jurisdiction151
involving aircraft piracy.152 Connecticut no longer authorizes the death penalty
for felony murder, but the affirmative defense serves as a safeguard against the
murder conviction.153 Therefore, three states not cited by the Tison majority
require substantial participation in the underlying felony before the death
penalty can be applied.154
2.

Mitigators for Minor Participation in the Murder or Felony

The Tison Court cited six states as taking minor participation in the felony
into account in mitigation of the felony murder.155 Currently, twenty-one
states have statutory mitigators that require a jury to consider the defendant’s
level of participation or culpability in the crime before imposing the death
penalty or other punishment.156 This jump represents a 250% increase in the
number of states that impose this consideration on the jury.
149. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(b) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (2006); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)–(d) (West 2005); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.25(3)(d) (McKinney Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(3)(a)–(e) (2005);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c)(i)–(iv) (West 2000).
150. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a), (c)
(West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
9A.32.030(1)(a) (West 2000), 10.95.020 (West Supp. 2006).
151. The author’s analysis does not include a recent review of federal jurisdictions and federal
legislative judgments.
152. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 153 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-46a(g)(4) (1985) and 49
U.S.C. app. §1473(c)(6)(D)).
153. See State v. Amado, 719 A.2d 45, 45 (Conn. 1998) (explaining that “only intentional
murders could serve as predicate for capital felony conviction”); State v. Johnson, 699 A.2d 57
(Conn. 1997) (explaining that felony murder cannot be the murder required for conviction of a
capital felony).
154. The three states are Arkansas, Colorado, and Oregon. See supra note 143.
155. Tison, 481 U.S. at 153. The majority mentioned that “at least” six states considered such
mitigating circumstances, but only cited six.
156. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (2001);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(5) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(j) (West 2006); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(d)–(e) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h) (West 2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (LexisNexis 2004); KAN.
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Three states actually have multiple mitigators that take culpability into
account.157 Colorado and Arizona, the state in which the Tison case originated,
now require consideration of whether the defendant’s conduct in the offense
was relatively minor compared to the other actors’ conduct, and whether the
defendant reasonably could have foreseen that his or her conduct during the
felony would cause someone’s death.158 In addition to providing mitigation for
a defendant’s minor participation, New Hampshire allows the jury to consider
that equally culpable defendants did not receive the death penalty.159
Instead of listing statutory mitigators, Ohio’s statute provides a list of
considerations for the jury to weigh against the statutory aggravating
circumstances.160 The state requires a jury to consider “the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and [the] background of
the offender . . . .”161 In addition, the jury must consider “the degree of the
offender’s participation in the offense and the degree of the offender’s
participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim.”162
Texas does not provide a list of mitigating circumstances that the
defendant can present to the jury. However, the state’s sentencing statute
requires the court to submit to the jury the issue of whether or not the
defendant actually caused the death of the victim, or did not actually cause the
death but did intend for the death to occur.163

STAT. ANN. § 21-4637 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19101(6) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (Supp.
2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI) (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 15A-2000(f)
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-320(C)(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070
(West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j) (2005).
157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3)–(4) (Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.31201(4)(d)–(e) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(c), (g) (1996).
158. See supra note 157 (providing Arizona’s and Colorado’s mitigation statutes).
159. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(g) (1996).
160. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1)–(7) (West Supp. 2006).
161. Id. § 2929.04(B).
162. Id. § 2929.04(B)(6).
163. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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Additional Aggravating Circumstances

Fourteen states currently require the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance (beyond commission or attempted
commission of the underlying felony) before authorizing the death penalty in a
felony murder case.164 When compared to the three states that the Tison
majority cited as requiring additional aggravation, this figure represents an
increase of almost 400%.165
Of the fourteen states that require additional aggravation, three still do not
authorize the death penalty in most cases for defendants who did not kill or
intend to kill. As previously discussed, the Colorado and Oregon statutes
provide an affirmative defense for nontriggermen who did not intend to kill.166
All of New Mexico’s aggravators require intent to kill, except when the victim
is a law enforcement officer.167
4.

Felony Murder Simpliciter

Imposition of the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter is obsolete.
As mentioned above, only three state statutes have not been updated to prohibit
a defendant’s execution solely for participation in an enumerated felony in
which someone was killed.168 That figure represents half of the number of
states that the Tison majority cited as allowing for capital punishment in cases
of felony murder simpliciter.169

164. The fourteen states include the thirteen states listed supra note 133 and New Mexico.
N.M. STAT. §§ 31-20A-3, 31-20A-5 (2005). New Mexico was not included in the previously
mentioned list because it is not among the twenty-two states that authorize the use of the death
penalty on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill (unless the victim is a law enforcement
officer). Id. § 31-20A-5.
165. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 153 (1987).
166. See supra note 143.
167. N.M. STAT. § 31-20A-5 (2000).
168. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. Enmund established that imposition of
the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter is unconstitutional. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797 (1982). Tison did not overrule this holding in that the Court still required a showing of a
culpable mental state. 481 U.S. at 157–59. Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina, therefore, may
simply have neglected to revise their statutes to reflect these decisions, assuming that the Court
automatically would apply the Enmund or Tison standard to each case. See supra notes 139–40
and accompanying text.
169. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 153. The Court referred to “six states which Enmund classified
along with Florida as permitting capital punishment for felony murder simpliciter.” Id.
(emphasis added). This statement implies that seven states actually authorized the punishment for
felony murder simpliciter; however, the Court cited only six and included Florida in its list. Id. at
n.8.
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“New” Death Penalty States

Since the Court decided Tison, Kansas and New York have reinstated the
death penalty.170 Both of these states forbid the imposition of the death penalty
on defendants who did not intend to kill.171 Also, New York does not even
classify felony murder as first degree, but rather as second degree, indicating
the legislature’s judgment that traditional felony murder does not involve the
level of culpability required to justify punishment for first degree murder.172
These two states represent legislatures that likely have considered the death
penalty issue more closely and more thoroughly than other states since Tison,
because these state legislatures had to formulate entire statutes before
reinstating the death penalty. After assuredly long debates and careful
consideration, both legislatures found the death penalty to be disproportionate
punishment for defendants who did not kill or intend to kill.
D. Summary of Statutory Findings
Twenty-eight states forbid imposing the death penalty on nontriggermen
who did not intend to kill.173 Of the twenty-two states that allow the death
penalty for nontriggermen under certain circumstances, nearly all have some
kind of statutory safeguard to limit its use on such offenders. Most of these
states provide a statutory mitigator for minor participation in the felony,174 and
some require proof of an additional aggravator, of a culpable mental state, or a
combination of both. Therefore, only one state’s legislature has failed to
incorporate the Enmund and Tison decisions into its homicide and death
penalty statutes.175
In two of its most recent analyses regarding the death penalty, Atkins and
Roper, the Court based its holdings largely on the “consistency of the direction
of change” among state legislatures.176 The legislatures appear to be, on
balance, moving toward prohibiting the death penalty’s use on nontriggermen

170. For reasons not relevant to this discussion, the highest courts in Kansas and New York
declared the states’ death penalty statutes unconstitutional in 2004. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 580 app. A (2005).
171. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004).
172. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 2004).
173. This figure represents the twelve states that have abolished the death penalty, plus the
sixteen discussed supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
174. Supra note 156. The Enmund Court said that the presence of these mitigators indicated
that states wanted to reduce the chance of nontriggermen receiving the death penalty. Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793 (1982).
175. See supra note 140 (providing a possible explanation of why felony murder simpliciter
statutes still exist). Georgia is the only state whose statute does not appear to have incorporated
Enmund and Tison. See supra Part III.B.3.
176. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316
(2002).
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who did not intend to kill; however, the change has not been significant and
does not appear to be happening very quickly.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
If the Court reconsiders the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty
on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill, its complete opinion must
include a proportionality analysis.177 In fact, a strong proportionality argument
may overcome weaker objective evidence, as it did in Atkins, according to
Justice O’Connor.178 To overrule Tison, the Court would have to show that a
defendant who does not kill or intend to kill does not deserve the same
punishment as someone who intended for the murder to occur, or who actually
committed the murder. In making this showing, the Court would have to
demonstrate that the penological goals of the death penalty—retribution and
deterrence—would not be served by executing such defendants.
A.

Culpability and Retribution

States began dividing murder into degrees to recognize that the “several
forms of murder varied greatly in degree of atrociousness.”179 Differentiating
murders then enabled the states to “match the penalty to the seriousness of the
offense.”180 The death penalty is the most serious and severe punishment;
therefore, it follows that it should be used only for the most serious crimes.
1.

Other Serious Crimes

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the death penalty
should be reserved for the most serious crimes and has noted that only a
narrow group of crimes falls into that category.181 Among the list of crimes
that the Court has determined to be unquestionably severe but not worthy of
the death penalty are 1) the rape of an adult woman,182 2) murder committed by
177. In his Tison dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the Constitution and Supreme Court
precedent require that the Court include a proportionality analysis in Eighth Amendment cases
involving the death penalty. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 168 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
178. In her dissent in Roper, Justice O’Connor said that the objective evidence in Atkins was
too weak to support the Court’s ruling, but that “the compelling proportionality argument against
capital punishment of the mentally retarded played a decisive role in the Court’s Eighth
Amendment ruling.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 606 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Bruce v. State, 566 A.2d 103, 107 (Md. 1989).
180. Id.
181. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). States that continually expand
lists of aggravating circumstances actually defy this notion. For example, the Illinois death
penalty statute included seven aggravating circumstances when it was passed in 1977; now, there
are twenty-one different ways that a defendant can be eligible for the death penalty. TUROW,
supra note 6, at 67–68.
182. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
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the mentally retarded,183 3) murder committed by a juvenile under the age of
eighteen,184 and 4) felony murder in which the defendant did not kill or intend
to kill.185 A reason for the Court’s hesitance in applying the death penalty in
such cases is that the defendants lack the “extreme culpability [that] makes
them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”186
The Roper Court found that juveniles lack this culpability due to a variety
of factors that essentially prevent the defendants from properly weighing the
consequences of their actions and from independently forming the intent
required to make them extremely culpable.187 If the Court has found that a
seventeen-year-old who actually formed an intent to kill is not extremely
culpable, in part because he was not capable of making an informed decision,
then it defies logic to find that a defendant who never forms such an intent or
makes such a decision does possess extreme culpability.188
As the Enmund Court noted, robbery is a serious crime that deserves
adequate punishment.189 However, it is not “so grievous an affront to
humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”190
Referring to the crime of robbery, the Court said,
[I]t does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking
of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, [robbery]
by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that, does not. Life is
over for the victim of the murderer; for the [robbery] victim, life . . . is not over
191
and normally is not beyond repair.

This same line of reasoning applies to any underlying felony that a
defendant may be guilty of forming an intent to commit. Arson, kidnapping,
rape, robbery, and burglary all deserve serious punishment. The mental state
required to commit these crimes, however, is far from the mental state
involved in intentionally taking a human life. Defendants who do not kill or
intend to kill lack the very thing that makes the crime of murder so
reprehensible: the thought process in which they decide that it is acceptable to
end a human life.

183. Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)).
186. See id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
187. See supra note 16 (providing a list of factors that led to the Court’s determination that
juveniles are not among the most culpable offenders).
188. In Roper, the defendant, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons, killed a woman by
throwing her off of a bridge. 543 U.S. at 556–57. In planning the murder with his friends,
Simmons assured them that they could “get away with it” because of their ages. Id. at 556.
189. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
190. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976)).
191. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)).
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Reckless Indifference

Acting recklessly and without concern for human life certainly is morally
reprehensible behavior that deserves severe punishment—especially when a
life is, in fact, lost as a result.192 However, as Justice Brennan acknowledged
in his Tison dissent, a reckless person’s culpability is necessarily less than that
of a person who actually killed or intended to kill.193 The reckless actor is less
culpable because he did not make a choice to kill another human being.194 The
law traditionally punishes individuals based on the decisions they make. A
person who chooses to rob should be punished for making—and acting on—
that choice. A person who chooses to rob and to kill someone in the process
should be punished for making both of those choices and certainly should be
punished on a different level than the person who chose only to rob.
a.

Model Penal Code

Proponents of applying the death penalty to nontriggermen who did not
intend to kill may point out that the Model Penal Code (MPC) includes in its
definition of murder “[homicide] committed recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”195 Grouping this
type of homicide into the same category as homicides committed purposely or
knowingly, these proponents may argue, indicates that the drafters of the MPC
equated reckless indifference with intent. This reasoning may support the
classification scheme, but it still does not support imposing the death penalty
on defendants who merely exhibit extreme indifference rather than an actual
intent to kill. The Comments to MPC section 210.2, the section on murder,
indicate that the drafters considered how states at the time classified murder
and whether they included a form of reckless homicide.196 However, the
drafters did not consider whether the states they referenced had a death penalty
or whether the states that did have the death penalty allowed for it to be
imposed in cases of reckless homicide. Absent such consideration, it cannot be
argued that the drafters of the MPC supported applying the death penalty to
cases in which the defendant did not kill or intend to kill—they simply
supported classifying extreme cases of reckless homicide as murder.

192. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 135, 170–71 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 171.
194. Id. at 170–71.
195. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
196. Id. § 210.2 cmt. 4 at 26 (noting, among other statutory observations, that at least fifteen
states recently revised their murder statutes, but maintained a form of reckless homicide).
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Common Law

Common law, however, defined murder as killing with “malice
aforethought.”197 At common law, malice consisted of killing “another human
being without justification (e.g., self-defense), excuse (e.g., insanity), or
mitigating circumstance (e.g., sudden heat of passion).”198 These types of
homicides traditionally are included as first degree murder in states that grade
offenses.199 On the other hand, manifesting extreme indifference to human life
is considered implied malice, which most often is classified as second
degree.200 Therefore, at common law, the death penalty would not apply to a
homicide in which the defendant exhibited extreme indifference to human life,
but did not kill or intend to kill.
c.

Rome Statute

The international community does not consider recklessness to be as
culpable of a mental state as intent. Although the United States is not a party
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), its modern
significance is arguably more noteworthy than that of the MPC.201 The
drafting process of the Rome Statute resembles that of the MPC, only on an
international level. It was a collaboration of the ideas of numerous countries
and was adopted only after several revisions and extensive negotiations,
including comprehensive discussions regarding the crimes over which the ICC
should have jurisdiction.202 Not only does it represent an international, rather
than a national, consensus, but it was created several decades after the MPC
was created.203

197. Id. § 210.2 cmt. 1 at 13 (citing Royal Comm’n on Capital Punishment, Report, CMD.
No. 8932, at 26 (1953)).
198. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 506.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 512.
201. The International Criminal Court website provides a list of the one hundred current State
Parties to the Rome Statute. International Criminal Court: The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). One author predicts that
the Rome Statute will have a far-reaching effect beyond its application on an international level:
The influence of the Rome Statute will extend deep into domestic criminal law. . . .
National courts have shown, in recent years, a growing enthusiasm for the use of
international law materials in the application of their own laws. The Statute itself, and
eventually the case law of the International Criminal Court, will no doubt contribute in
this area.
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 19
(2001).
202. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 201, at 1–20 (discussing the creation of the ICC).
203. The Rome Statute originally was adopted by 120 international states on July 17, 1998.
Id. at vii. The MPC was adopted by the American Law Institute on May 24, 1962. MODEL
PENAL CODE (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
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The drafters of the Rome Statute debated about whether or not to lower the
mens rea threshold in Article 30 to that of recklessness or gross negligence.
They ultimately decided that the “most serious crimes” over which the ICC
had jurisdiction necessarily required intent.204 By deleting a bracketed text on
recklessness, the drafters, who represented a large part of the international
community, asserted that recklessness and intent are not equally culpable
mental states.205
3.

The Average Offender

The Court has reiterated that the culpability of the average offender does
not justify applying the death penalty.206 The Court has reasoned that if the
average offender is not culpable enough to deserve the most severe punishment
available, then juvenile and mentally retarded offenders definitely do not
warrant this type of retribution.207 Defendants who do not kill or intend to kill
similarly are not among the average offenders and certainly should not be held
more accountable than the average murderer.
4.

Balancing the Wrong to the Victim and Expressing the Community’s
Moral Outrage

The Roper Court said that retribution can involve either balancing the
wrong done to the victim208 or expressing the community’s “moral outrage”
toward the offense.209 Neither of these purposes is properly served by
imposing the death penalty on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill.
This class of defendants does not actually take the victim’s life, so
counteracting the victim’s death with such a defendant’s death does not
establish balance. Proponents of this principle of retribution may argue that an
actual killer, or a defendant who intended for the victim to be killed, can be
executed to “balance” the harm done. However, they cannot in good
conscience argue that executing a nontriggerman who did not intend to kill
provides proper balance.
There are several dangers inherent in allowing community sentiment to
dictate punishment. First of all, community sentiment can be fleeting, and we
should be extremely hesitant to let such sentiment contribute to an irreversible,
204. SCHABAS, supra note 201, at 86; see also text accompanying infra notes 246–47.
205. See SCHABAS, supra note 201, at 86–87.
206. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319
(2002).
207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20.
208. This principle of retribution coincides with the “eye for an eye” theory of punishment.
For a discussion of the defining characteristics of retributivist theory of punishment, see Michael
S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, as reprinted in JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 39–40 (3d ed. 2003).
209. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
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permanent punishment.210 Also, we should not allow for a human life to be
taken simply as a salve for a community’s anger. Individuals should be
punished based on the crimes they actually commit—not on the crimes as the
public sees them or on the outrage that the public may justifiably express at the
result of the crime.211
Lay citizens most likely are not aware of the criminal elements necessary
to prove that a crime has been committed—especially the concept of mens rea
and its role in determining what crime has been committed. Therefore, when
such citizens who support the death penalty learn of a robbery in which
someone was killed, the knee-jerk reaction may be to demand the death of
anyone involved in the robbery because, in their minds, any killing is murder
and any murder is death penalty-eligible. This obviously is not how the legal
system operates, and if it did, there would be no punishment left to distinguish
the most abhorrent and most reprehensible crimes.
Allowing community and victim judgments to dictate punishment also may
contribute to the randomness associated with applying the death penalty.
Some victims’ families and communities may oppose the death penalty or may
be more willing to accept the quick finality of a defendant’s guilty plea. Other
families and communities, however, may insist that prosecutors go to trial and
pursue the death penalty at all costs. As a result, one defendant may receive
life in prison while another is executed after committing a virtually identical
crime.212

210. The American public’s moral outrage often wanes with time. For example, when the
public first learned of President Bill Clinton’s affair with his intern, there was a cry for
impeachment and obvious public disgust for his conduct. However, by the time Kenneth Starr’s
investigation was completed, the public seemed to be directing its disgust toward Starr and his
voracious attack on the President. This example is not an attempt to compare President Clinton’s
extramarital affair with the atrocity of murder, but rather to demonstrate how the public can insist
on the worst punishment possible immediately after learning of an offender’s act, only to later
realize that such punishment may need to be reserved for conduct that is even more egregious.
“[T]he sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a
seal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a
transient sentiment.” JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 80–82 (1883), as reprinted in DRESSLER, supra note 208, at 41.
211. Immanuel Kant advocated the principle that a human being should never be used to
satisfy someone else’s purpose. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, as reprinted in
DRESSLER, supra note 208, at 40. “Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a
means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil
society . . . .” Id.
212. According to an Associated Press study of the Ohio death penalty, 50% of the capital
indictments filed between 1981 and 2002 resulted in plea bargains. Death Penalty Information
Center, Arbitrariness: Prevalence of Plea Bargains in Death Penalty Cases, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2093 (scroll to article) (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). Of the cases
that ended in plea agreements, 131 of the defendants killed multiple victims; meanwhile, 196 of
the 274 people sentenced to death during the same time period had killed a single victim. Id.
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Deterrence

The deterrent value of the death penalty for any kind of murder is
debatable, and most likely will continue to be debated as long as the death
penalty is applied.213 However, the Tison Court did not provide a single
deterrent argument for applying the death penalty in felony murder cases.214
The death penalty cannot be an effective deterrent when the felony itself did
not carry with it a substantial risk of death and when there was no intent for the
murder to take place.
1.

Low Risk of Death Even in Inherently Dangerous Felonies

Robbery, rape, and burglary are considered some of the most inherently
dangerous felonies, as evidenced by the fact that they are among the
enumerated felonies in virtually every felony murder statute.215 However, the
Enmund Court noted that the risk of someone dying during the course of a
robbery is not so substantial that someone who simply participates in the
robbery should share in the blame when a victim is killed.216 In fact, crime
statistics at the time showed that, in 1980, death occurred only in about 0.43%
of robberies—supporting the majority’s argument that the death penalty cannot
act as an effective deterrent in such cases.217 If this statistic was enough to
support the Court’s finding in 1982, then the present statistics are even more
convincing.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime
Reports, only 0.25% of robberies in 2004 resulted in murder.218 The
percentage of robberies that result in murder has dropped to nearly half of the
percentage that the Enmund Court found to be an insignificant amount. As for

213. A survey of leaders among the top criminological societies in the country revealed that
84% of those experts said that the death penalty is not a deterrent to murder. Facts About the
Death Penalty (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C.), at 3, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). Also, the South has
the highest murder rate among all of the regions in the United States, but also accounts for 56%
of the executions nationwide. Id. Meanwhile, the Northeast has the lowest murder rate and
accounts for less than 1% of executions. Id. Another study shows that death penalty states
usually have higher murder rates than neighboring non-death penalty states. Death Penalty
Information Center: Deterrence, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (follow “Issues” hyperlink;
then follow “Deterrence” hyperlink; then follow “Studies Comparing States with and without the
Death Penalty” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
214. See supra Part II.B.2.D.
215. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(3) (West
2005).
216. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 781, 799 (1982).
217. Id. at 800 n.24.
218. There were 401,326 reported robberies in 2004 and 988 murders that occurred during the
course of a robbery. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
2004—UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 23, 31 (2004).
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rape, 0.038% of the 94,635 rapes reported in 2004 resulted in murder.219 Of
the 2,143,456 burglaries reported in 2004, only 77 resulted in murder.220 That
means that burglary, considered by state legislatures to be among the most
inherently dangerous felonies, carries with it only a 0.0036% chance of
someone being killed.
When someone actually is killed during one of these felonies, if the death
penalty is not frequently imposed on such defendants, its deterrent value is
reduced even further. Although recent numbers are not available, one of the
drafts of the MPC noted that the “odds against a robbery ending with a death
sentence . . . were . . . 1,286 to 1,” and the odds were 1,133 to 1 that a rapist
would be sentenced to death.221 These numbers imply two things. First, juries
do not often sentence felony murder defendants to death when they did not kill
or intend to kill. This jury hesitance itself is a consideration in determining
whether the death penalty is constitutional in certain circumstances. Second,
the death penalty is applied so infrequently in these situations that the
punishment is not likely to deter either the commission of the underlying
felony or any killing that occurs during the course of the felony.
This argument is not an attempt to minimize the value of the lives actually
lost during these felonies, but rather is meant to demonstrate that there is no
deterrent value in executing defendants who did not kill or intend to kill while
participating in these felonies. The numbers represent the fact that an
overwhelming majority of defendants who participate in these felonies do not
kill, so the threat of the death penalty would not have any effect in keeping
them from killing. As for deterring them from participating in the underlying
felonies, the death penalty is an improper deterrent. First, threatening death for
participating in a felony in which killing is not an essential element is
inherently unbalanced and certainly excessive. Also, the chance of a murder
occurring during the course of such a felony is so minute that an offender most
likely would not consider the possibility of the death penalty when deciding
whether or not to commit a robbery, for example.
2.

Deterring Recklessness

A penological goal of any punishment is to deter commission of the crime
associated with the punishment. The courts in People v. Gentry222 and Bruce

219.
23, 27.
220.
221.
222.

There were 36 murders reportedly committed in conjunction with a rape in 2004. Id. at
Id. at 23, 45.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 cmt. 4(C) n.10 (Tentative Draft No. 9 1959).
People v. Gentry, 510 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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v. State223 took notice that there would be no deterrent value in punishing
defendants for crimes that they had no intention of committing.224
In Gentry, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that to be guilty of
attempted murder, a defendant must have had an intent to kill.225 The court
said that “intent to do bodily harm, or knowledge that the consequences of
defendant’s act may result in death or great bodily harm, is not enough.”226
Using similar reasoning in Bruce, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
there is no such crime as attempted felony murder.227 Because the only intent
required to prove felony murder is the intent to commit the underlying felony,
and because criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, one cannot attempt to
commit felony murder.228
In Gentry, the defendant acted recklessly and put the victim’s life in
danger;229 however, because he did not specifically intend to kill her, punishing
him for trying to kill her would have had no effect in keeping him (or others)
from attempting murder in the future.
The Bruce court noted, “There is no such criminal offense as an attempt to
achieve an unintended result.”230 In so finding, the court recognized that there
would be no deterrent value in punishing someone for a crime he or she did not
intend to commit. If results are unintended, as they necessarily are in the cases
of nontriggermen who did not intend to kill, then there can be no deterrent
value in executing such defendants. Executing these defendants will not keep
others like them from deciding to take a life, because they never made that
decision.

223. Bruce, 566 A.2d at 106.
224. One scholar suggests that the only types of conduct that criminal law can affect are
intentional action and forbearance. Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal
Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 363 (2004). Because the goal of criminal law is to
guide behavior, Professor Morse argues that “a rational system of criminal law should focus
solely on actions and should not impose punishment based on results.” Id. The drafters of the
MPC similarly argued, “[M]urders are, upon the whole, either crimes of passion, in which a
calculus of consequences has small psychological reality, or crimes of such depravity that the
actor reveals himself as doubtfully within the reach of influences that might be especially
inhibitory in the case of the ordinary man.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft
No. 9 1959).
225. Gentry, 510 N.E.2d at 966.
226. Id.
227. Bruce, 566 A.2d at 106
228. Id. at 105.
229. See Gentry, 510 N.E.2d at 964.
230. Bruce, 566 A.2d at 105.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA

929

V. INTERNATIONAL OPINION231
Whereas the Roper Court was able to point to specific international laws
prohibiting the execution of juveniles, international guidance on executing
nontriggermen who did not intend to kill is less specific.232 A common theme
in the international community is that countries that still use the death penalty
should impose it only for the most serious of crimes. Treaties and other
international documents indicate that the international community defines the
most serious crimes as including an intent to kill.
A.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Along with other members of the United Nations, the United States ratified
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)233 in an effort
“to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms.”234 Article 6(2) of the treaty states: “In countries which have not
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the
most serious crimes . . . .”235 While the Court claims to follow the ideal of
imposing the death penalty only for the most serious crimes, it is doubtful that
the Court’s definition of what constitutes the “most serious crimes” coincides
with the meaning that the ICCPR intended for that category of crimes.
B.

American Declaration

The United States is a member of the Organization of American States
(OAS), which has adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties

231. This Comment will not discuss the general role of international law in interpreting death
penalty jurisprudence. For a discussion of this topic, see Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty
in the United States: An International Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115
(2002); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004).
232. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
233. The ICCPR is a binding treaty that provides restrictions on how countries use the death
penalty. Bishop, supra note 231, at 1131. In 1998, President Clinton stated: “It shall be the
policy and practice of the Government of the United States, being committed to the protection
and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its
obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is a party.” Id. at 1117
(quoting Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998)).
234. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States ratified the ICCPR with a restriction
stating that “[t]he United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to
impose capital punishment on any person (other than pregnant women) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such
punishment . . . .” Bishop, supra note 231, at 1133–34 (emphasis added).
235. ICCPR, supra note 234, at art. 6, § 2.
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of Man.236 The OAS then adopted the American Convention on Human
Rights,237 which states that the death penalty only can be imposed for the most
serious crimes.238 The United States has not yet ratified this Convention.239
C. Interpreting “Most Serious Crimes”
1.

United Nations

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly
emphasized that the “most serious crimes” include only intentional crimes.
Beginning in 1999, the Commission has annually adopted a resolution that
states that “the notion of ‘most serious crimes’ does not go beyond intentional
crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences.”240 Each year, the
resolution “[u]rges all States that still maintain the death penalty . . . to comply
fully with their obligations under the [ICCPR] . . . , notably not to impose the
death penalty for any but the most serious crimes . . . .”241
The United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted these standards
in its death penalty safeguards. The first safeguard states that “capital
punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, it being

236. Bishop, supra note 231, at 1142. The American Declaration became legally binding in
1967. Id. at 1142–43. The OAS created it under the ideal that “[e]very human being has the right
to life, liberty and the security of his person.” Id. at 1142.
237. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673.
238. Corte
Interamericana
de
Derechos
Humanos:
Información–historia,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); see Bishop, supra note 231, at
1143.
239. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Información–historia, supra note 238. The
Convention created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights to promote and protect the principles of the Convention. Id. Because the
United States has not adopted the American Convention on Human Rights, it is questionable
whether the country is bound by the advisory opinions and court decisions rendered by these two
bodies. However, it is included in this discussion for purposes of explaining international
standards as they apply to the death penalty in cases of unintentional crimes.
240. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2005/59 ¶ 7(f), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/59 (Apr. 20,
2005); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2004/67 ¶ 4(f), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/67 (Apr. 21,
2004); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/67 ¶ 4(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67 (Apr. 24,
2003); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2002/77 ¶ 4(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77 (Apr. 25,
2002); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2001/68 ¶ 4(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (Apr. 25,
2001); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2000/65 ¶ 3(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (Apr. 26,
2000); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1999/61 ¶ 3(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (Apr. 28,
1999).
241. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2002/77 ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77 (Apr. 25,
2002); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2001/68 ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (Apr. 25,
2001); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2000/65 ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (Apr. 26,
2000); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1999/61 ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (Apr. 28,
1999).
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understood that their scope should not go beyond intentional crimes with lethal
or other extremely grave consequences.”242
2.

Rome Statute

The preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC states that “the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished . . . .”243 This language establishes that the scope of the ICC’s
jurisdiction is limited to only the most serious crimes. Article 30 of the statute
states that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are
committed with intent and knowledge.”244 Article 30, taken together with the
Preamble, indicates that the drafters of the Rome Statute considered intent a
necessary element of crimes in the “most serious” category.
3.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has held that the death
penalty must not be imposed for crimes that are not of “exceptional gravity.”245
The Commission noted that the varying degrees of gravity and individual
culpability must be considered before imposing the death penalty.246 The
Commission also has recognized that a botched robbery attempt in which the

242. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1984/50 (May 25, 1984).
243. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 1, 2002, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf
[hereinafter
Rome Statute].
244. Id. at art. 30. Article 30 goes on to define “intent,” explaining,
For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
Id. at art. 30(2). The statute defines “knowledge” as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.” Id. at art. 30(3).
245. See, e.g., Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/01,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 29 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
2000eng/chapteriii/merits/USA12.243.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
246. See Edwards v. Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/01,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 65 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/
2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Bahamas12.067.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Hall v. Bahamas,
Case 12.068, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 65 (2001),
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Bahamas12.067.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2007); Schroeter & Bowleg v. Bahamas, Case 12.086, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 65 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Bahamas12.067.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
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defendant did not kill or intend to kill the victims was not a crime of
exceptional gravity and did not warrant the death penalty.247
D. International Law and the Tison Crime
The Tison decision and the standard it set forth violate these international
standards because the Tison brothers did not intend for the murders to take
place; therefore, they were sentenced to death for a crime that does not meet
the “most serious” criteria. The intentional crimes referred to in the safeguards
cannot be the underlying felony in a felony murder case, because even the
Court has conceded that crimes outside of murder are not serious enough to
qualify for the death penalty.248
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court revisits the issue of whether it is constitutional to
execute an offender who did not kill or intend to kill, it should consider, as it
has in the past, legislative judgments, proportionality, retribution, and
deterrence rationales, and international law and opinion. A thorough review of
current legislation reveals that a majority of states do not provide further
restrictions than those imposed by Enmund and Tison. However, most of the
states that do not prohibit punishment for defendants who did not kill or intend
to kill have statutory safeguards in place so that less culpable offenders have
less of a chance of being executed.
The two justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—
do not apply to felony murder cases in which the defendant did not kill or
intend to kill. If the Court considers international law and the United States’
treaty obligations, it will find that an honest definition of the “most serious
crimes” cannot include those in which a defendant did not kill or intend to kill.
Although, based on a thorough proportionality analysis, the Court should
hold that it is unconstitutional to execute a defendant who did not kill or intend
to kill, it is not likely to do so if it revisits the issue in the near future. For the
Court to overrule Tison, either more state legislatures will need to revise their
statutes so that nontriggermen who did not intend to kill are not eligible for the
death penalty, or international law will have to take a more definite stance on
the issue. With a compelling proportionality argument, evidence of changing

247. Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 57/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 177 (1996). In the Andrews case, the defendant and an
accomplice, Pierre Selby, went to rob a radio store, where people still happened to be present. Id.
at ¶ 39. Andrews and Selby restrained the victims in the basement of the store, and Selby made
them drink drain cleaner. Id. After stating that he could not make the victims drink the poison,
Andrews left the store. Unbeknownst to Andrews, Selby then shot the victims. Id. at ¶ 39–40.
One survivor verified Andrews’s version of the events. Id.
248. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA

933

legislative judgment or well-defined international law could influence the
Court.249 However, a proportionality argument alone is not likely to convince
a majority of the Justices of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty in these
cases.
The effects of a murder are equal, no matter who kills or is killed: a victim
loses a life, a survivor loses a loved one, and society as a whole loses some of
its dignity. Although the effects are equal, however, the crimes and the
culpability of those involved are not. Our criminal justice system is based on
this “inequality” of crimes, and our punishments must reflect it. The most
critical choice a criminal can make is whether to take a human life. One of the
most critical choices our criminal justice system can make is whether to
recognize the criminal’s choice.
MELANIE A. RENKEN*

249. Research of jury activity in death penalty cases involving nontriggermen would shed
additional light on the constitutionality of applying the death penalty in such cases. The Court
should consider how often juries impose the death penalty in these cases. If juries rarely impose
the punishment, then this would weigh heavily in favor of finding it unconstitutional.
* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2007. I would like to thank Professor
David Sloss for his invaluable guidance and, more importantly, for his faith in my ability to
handle this daunting project. I especially would like to thank my husband and best friend, Tom,
for his patience, love, and unwavering support throughout my law school career.
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